Off topic: Via Freedom to Coercion: The Emergence of Costly Punishment Initiator des Themas: Vito Smolej
|
|---|
Vito Smolej
Deutschland
Local time: 01:48
Mitglied (2004)
Englisch > Slowenisch
+ ...
SITE LOCALIZER
from Science 29 June 2007, Vol. 316. no. 5833, pp. 1905 - 1907
In human societies, cooperative behavior in joint enterprises is often enforced through institutions that impose sanctions on defectors. ... Theoretical models confirm that social norms prescribing the punishment of uncooperative behavior are stable—once established, they prevent dissident minorities from spreading. But how can such costly punishing behavior gain a foothold in the population? A surprisingly simple mode... See more from Science 29 June 2007, Vol. 316. no. 5833, pp. 1905 - 1907
In human societies, cooperative behavior in joint enterprises is often enforced through institutions that impose sanctions on defectors. ... Theoretical models confirm that social norms prescribing the punishment of uncooperative behavior are stable—once established, they prevent dissident minorities from spreading. But how can such costly punishing behavior gain a foothold in the population? A surprisingly simple model shows that if individuals have the option to stand aside and abstain from the joint endeavor, this paves the way for the emergence and establishment of cooperative behavior based on the punishment of defectors. Paradoxically, the freedom to withdraw from the common enterprise leads to enforcement of social norms(bold by smo). ...
An impressive body of evidence shows that many humans are willing to pay a personal cost in order to punish wrongdoers (1–8). In particular, punishment is an effective mechanism to ensure cooperation in public goods interactions (9–11). All human populations seem willing to use costly punishment to varying degrees, and their willingness to punish correlates with the propensity for altruistic contributions (12). This raises an evolutionary problem: In joint enterprises, free-riding individuals who do not contribute, but who exploit the efforts of others, fare better than those who pay the cost of contributing. If successful behavior spreads, for instance through imitation, these defectors will eventually take over. Punishment reduces the defectors' payoff, and thus may solve the social dilemma. However, because punishment is costly, it also reduces the punishers' payoff. This raises a "second-order social dilemma": Costly punishment seems to be an altruistic act, given that individuals who contribute but do not punish are better off than the punishers. The emergence of costly punishing behavior is acknowledged to be a major puzzle in the evolution of cooperation. "We seem to have replaced the problem of explaining cooperation with that of explaining altruistic punishment" (13).
This puzzle can be solved in situations where individuals can decide whether to take part in the joint enterprise. We considered four strategies. The nonparticipants (individuals who, by default, do not join the public enterprise) rely on some activity whose payoff is independent of the other players' behavior. Those who participate include defectors, who do not contribute but exploit the contributions of the others; cooperators, who contribute but do not punish; and punishers, who not only contribute to the commonwealth but also punish the defectors. We showed that in such a model, punishers will invade and predominate. However, in the absence of the option to abstain from the joint enterprise, punishers are often unable to invade, and the population is dominated by defectors. This means that if participation in the joint enterprise is voluntary, cooperation-enforcing behavior emerges. If participation is obligatory, then the defectors are more likely to win.
.... etc
PS: this dialectics, this interaction between free riders (we usually call them a*holes) vs honest players is so realistic. Do you see any parallels (g)?
Enjoy
Vito ▲ Collapse
| | | | | The parallels are too numerous to mention | Jul 10, 2007 |
It's nice when someone can take something as complicated as human behaviour on a massive scale and boil it down to its essence. As I was reading this post, my mind jumped from 1930s Germany, to a very busy hospital I once worked at, to the "Free Press" of 21st century U.S.A. and Mexico. As ProZ is a worldwide forum, I imagine that many people can comment on this from a local perspective.
I wonder if ants deal with this phenomenon. Probably not. They probably just bite the heads... See more It's nice when someone can take something as complicated as human behaviour on a massive scale and boil it down to its essence. As I was reading this post, my mind jumped from 1930s Germany, to a very busy hospital I once worked at, to the "Free Press" of 21st century U.S.A. and Mexico. As ProZ is a worldwide forum, I imagine that many people can comment on this from a local perspective.
I wonder if ants deal with this phenomenon. Probably not. They probably just bite the heads off those who do not contribute their fair share.
SaludoZ! ▲ Collapse
| | | | lingomania
Local time: 09:48
Italienisch > Englisch
I don't know if ants bite off those heads, but maybe they will surely laugh at "human behaviour".
Rob
| | | | Lia Fail (X) 
Spanien
Local time: 01:48
Spanisch > Englisch
+ ...
| some questions | Jul 10, 2007 |
"We showed that in such a model, punishers will invade and predominate. "
I had a good look at the arguments and need to know WHY punishers will invade when participation in the joint enterprise is not mandatory. Otherwise I can't really make sense of it:-)
You ask about parallels; are you referring to ProZ, where, according to this theory, the voluntary nature of the enterprise ultimately leads to cooperation-enforcing behaviour?
ProZ has:
"de... See more "We showed that in such a model, punishers will invade and predominate. "
I had a good look at the arguments and need to know WHY punishers will invade when participation in the joint enterprise is not mandatory. Otherwise I can't really make sense of it:-)
You ask about parallels; are you referring to ProZ, where, according to this theory, the voluntary nature of the enterprise ultimately leads to cooperation-enforcing behaviour?
ProZ has:
"defectors", who do not contribute but exploit the contributions of the others
"cooperators", who contribute but do not punish
"punishers, who not only contribute to the commonwealth but also punish the defectors.
Of the two joint enterprise (JE) possibilities, mandatory JE and voluntary JE, do all 4 categories of players exist in both communities? ▲ Collapse
| | |
|
|
|
Vito Smolej
Deutschland
Local time: 01:48
Mitglied (2004)
Englisch > Slowenisch
+ ...
THEMENSTARTER SITE LOCALIZER | The model is crude somewhat... | Jul 11, 2007 |
but Id say even Kopernicus did not have all the facts pat either (g).
I wonder if ants deal with this phenomenon. Absolutely. They kill the defectors.
| | | | lingomania
Local time: 09:48
Italienisch > Englisch
Vito Smolej wrote:
but Id say even Kopernicus did not have all the facts pat either (g).
I wonder if ants deal with this phenomenon. Absolutely. They kill the defectors.
..........then again, ants are not Homo Sapiens Sapiens
| | | | Vito Smolej
Deutschland
Local time: 01:48
Mitglied (2004)
Englisch > Slowenisch
+ ...
THEMENSTARTER SITE LOCALIZER | A good point... | Jul 11, 2007 |
I had a good look at the arguments and need to know WHY punishers will invade when participation in the joint enterprise is not mandatory. Otherwise I can't really make sense of it:-)
absolutely... without the rest of the article it does not make sense. The real point goes even one step further: the punishers will NOT prevail if the participation in the joint enterprise is mandatory - do I see a glipse of Contrat social here?...
Yes, all 4 species coexist at all times. The stable status with punishers prevailing is interspersed with short chaotic interludes, which end in a sort of a fist/paper/scissor sequence. With punishers eventually back at the top.
Punishers ... they pay rather high price for this role. In ProZ that would be those, who make BB entries, knowing they will probably get ostracized.
Regards and Ill try to send some private mail to you.
Vito
[Edited at 2007-07-11 20:01]
| | | | Lia Fail (X)
Spanien
Local time: 01:48
Spanisch > Englisch
+ ...
Vito Smolej wrote:
I had a good look at the arguments and need to know WHY punishers will invade when participation in the joint enterprise is not mandatory. Otherwise I can't really make sense of it:-)
absolutely... without the rest of the article it does not make sense. The real point goes even one step further: the punishers will NOT prevail if the participation in the joint enterprise is mandatory - do I see a glipse of Contrat social here?...
Yes, all 4 species coexist at all times. The stable status with punishers prevailing is interspersed with short chaotic interludes, which end in a sort of a fist/paper/scissor sequence. With punishers eventually back at the top.
Punishers ... they pay rather high price for this role. In ProZ that would be those, who make BB entries, knowing they will probably get ostracized.
Regards and Ill try to send some private mail to you.
Vito
[Edited at 2007-07-11 20:01]
Thanks for the full articles, Vito!
Costly punishment/punishers .... I don't think it's so much that they might be ostracised, it might be that it's actually painful and stressful to "punish".
For example, someone in one of my language pairs riles me, as I see how s/he asks Q after Q (and by now there are 000s of Qs asked by him/her), but s/he has NEVER helped anyone .... that is a freerider or defector.
I could draw attention to him/her in the forum but there are a number of reasons I don't, one of which is I simply couldn't be bothered to deal with irritation - my own, those of people who don't agree, those of people accusing others of policing, etc etc ...and moaning in itself is a punishment to oneself. That's a bit personal, but I don't much like to moan (although I do I guess!).
I'm not sure if teh "costliness" in the articles referred to this kind of internal cost of a negative feeling or emotion. But there has been "punishing" in Proz in the past and it has been costly, as it created a lot of tensions. I think this was more so before than now.
| | | | To report site rules violations or get help, contact a site moderator: You can also contact site staff by submitting a support request » Via Freedom to Coercion: The Emergence of Costly Punishment | Wordfast Pro |
|---|
Translation Memory Software for Any Platform
Exclusive discount for ProZ.com users!
Save over 13% when purchasing Wordfast Pro through ProZ.com. Wordfast is the world's #1 provider of platform-independent Translation Memory software. Consistently ranked the most user-friendly and highest value
Buy now! » |
| | Trados Studio 2022 Freelance |
|---|
The leading translation software used by over 270,000 translators.
Designed with your feedback in mind, Trados Studio 2022 delivers an unrivalled, powerful desktop
and cloud solution, empowering you to work in the most efficient and cost-effective way.
More info » |
|
| | | | X Sign in to your ProZ.com account... | | | | | |
Login to reply/comment 
